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Arizona v. Norris: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and Retroactive Relief
I. Introduction
Although the Supreme Court, in Arizona Governing Com-
mittee v. Norris,1 recently extended the scope of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19642 to encompass sexually discriminatory
retirement benefits, 8 the Court's decision signals a retreat from a
presumption in favor of awarding retroactive relief upon a find-
ing of unlawful discrimination. The Norris Court held that Title
VII prohibits an employer from offering to employees a deferred
compensation plan which pays a woman a lower monthly annu-
ity benefit than a similarly situated man when both have con-
tributed the same amount from their salary to the plan. The
decision extends the protections of Title VII to prohibit discrim-
inatory plans operated on behalf of an employer by a third
party, private insurance company.5Despite the Supreme Court's finding of a Title VII viola-
tion, however, the Court declined to fashion a remedy consistent
with a presumption it had previously established in favor of
awarding retroactive relief. Title VII provides that a court
"may" order back pay to an employee who has lost the opportu-
nity to earn wages as a result of an unlawful discriminatory em-
1. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
2. Section 703(a)(1), a portion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relevant
to this Note, provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin ....
Civil Rights Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241,
255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976)).
3. Retirement benefits constitute "compensation" under Title VII. Arizona Gov-
erning Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3496; City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712 n.23 (1978).
4. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
5. See id. at 3499-502; see also infra text accompanying notes 102-15.
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ployment practice. This discretionary section was interpreted in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,7 where the Court concluded that
once unlawful discrimination has been found, back pay should
be awarded unless such an award would frustrate the central
statutory purposes of Title VII.8 The Court's decision in Norris
indicates a willingness to overcome the Albemarle presumption
in favor of preserving the solvency of pension funds at the ex-
pense of undermining inducements created to encourage compli-
ance with Title VII.
Part II of this Note presents City of Los Angeles, Depart-
ment of Water & Power v. Manhart as the precursor to the
Norris decision; a review of the guiding principles of Albemarle
follows. Part III sets forth the facts of Norris and the rationale
offered by the Court for extending the protections of Title VII
while denying retroactive relief. Part IV analyzes the decision to
deny retroactive relief in Norris.10 This Note concludes that the
Court erred in denying retroactive relief in Norris, since the de-
fendants should have been put on notice by the Manhart deci-
6. Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
7. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
8. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 421. The central statutory purposes of
Title VII are to eradicate discrimination throughout the economy and make persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. Id. See infra text accompanying
notes 50-65. Thus, "retroactive relief is normally appropriate in the typical Title VII case
." Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510 (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 719). The Court in Norris uses the term "retroactive relief"
rather than "back pay." This is due to the fact that the Norris case involves a retirement
benefit derived from contributions made by the employee. Any retroactive award to the
plaintiffs based on these contributions or the resulting retirement benefits are therefore
not "back pay" in the ordinary sense of the word. Thus, the term retroactive relief rather
than back pay is used throughout this Note in the context of retirement benefits.
9. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
10. This Note analyzes the issue of retroactive relief as a remedy for a Title VII
violation. The analysis does not extend to the issue of whether the Court was correct in
applying Title VII to the provision of retirement benefits by third party insurance com-
panies on behalf of employers.
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sion that the state's retirement benefit program violated Title
VII.
II. Background
A. Liability Under Title VII: The Manhart Decision
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in City of Los
Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,11 the
courts had not confronted the question of whether the well-es-
tablished practice of using sex-based mortality tables12 in calcu-
lating retirement benefits s was unlawful, sex-based discrimina-
tion under Title VII. ' The Manhart Court ruled that it was an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII to require fe-
males to contribute more to their pension plans than males
earning the same salary.15 Five years later, in Arizona Governing
11. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
12. A mortality table is used as a method of expressing the probable number of
years a person of a given age will live. E. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSUR-
ANCE 195 (3d ed. 1982). The use of sex-based mortality tables in determining retirement
benefits for employees was generally considered to be universal prior to Manhart. See
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704; see generally
Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624 (1973) (dis-
cusses the discriminatory impact of universal reliance on sex-based mortality tables).
Separate sex-based mortality tables are used to reflect the fact that, on the average,
women live longer than men. See J. ATHEARN, RISK AND INSURANCE 170-74 (1977).
13. The predominate methods for providing retirement benefits are the "defined-
benefit" plan and the "defined-contribution" plan. Under a "defined-benefit" plan, bene-
fits are "defined" or predetermined in advance, either as a percentage of salary or set at
a flat level..Benefits are the same for similarly employed males and females. This type of
plan is widespread in private industry; the majority of the plans do not require the em-
ployee to contribute from his or her salary. Due to a female's greater longevity, and the
resulting higher cost of her pension, the employer's contribution on behalf of the female
group is necessarily higher. Under "defined-contribution" plans, a "defined" percentage
of the employees' salary is contributed toward the plan, regardless of sex. The benefits
are not stated in advance, and upon retirement the accumulated funds are used to pro-
vide a variety of retirement benefits. This type of plan is favored by public sector em-
ployers. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 176-79 (1976).
14. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722.
15. Id. at 717. The retirement plan utilized by Los Angeles was somewhat of an
anomaly in that it required a female participant in a "defined-benefit" public sector plan
to contribute from her own salary the higher cost of her pension. Although many public
sector plans require employee contributions, they are generally "defined-contribution"
plans. See also supra note 13. See generally W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 13 at
177.
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Committee v. Norris,16 the Court extended the Manhart ration-
ale to a plan operated on behalf of an employer by a third party,
private insurance company.1"
To appreciate the Court's holding in Norris, one must be
familiar with the Manhart Court's expanded reading oc Title
VII in the context of employee retirement plans. In Manhart,
the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (the
Department) administered a retirement plan in which all de-
partmental employees were required to participate. 8 The
monthly retirement benefits paid to male and female employees
of the same age, seniority, and salary were equal.'9 Based on
mortality tables" and the Department's own experience, how-
ever, the Department determined that it would cost more to pro-
vide a female employee's retirement benefits, since a woman has
a statistically greater chance to live longer than a man and thus
collect a greater number of monthly pension benefits." As a re-
sult, the Department required women to contribute 14.84%
more than their male counterparts.22 Because the employee con-
tributions were taken directly from their paychecks, females
brought home a lower monthly salary than similarly situated
males.a2
In 1973, Marie Manhart brought a class action in the
United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia on behalf of women employed or formerly employed by the
16. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
17. Id.
18. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 345 U.S. at 704.
The plan provided several types of retirement benefits. The most common was calcu-
lated on the basis of two percent of the average monthly salary paid during the last year
of employment times the number of years of employment, guaranteed for life. Id. at
705 n.3; see also supra note 13.
19. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 345 U.S. at 705. The
benefits were funded by employee contributions, an employer contribution equal to
110% of all employee contributions, and income earned on the contributions. Id. at n.4.
20. See supra note 12.
21. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705. The
Department estimated that its 2000 female employees will live, on average, a few years
longer than its 10,000 male employees. Id. See supra note 12.
22. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705.
23. Id. For example, one woman joining the suit had contributed $18,171.40 (includ-
ing interest on the amount withheld) to the fund; at the same time, a similarly situated
male employee would contribute only $12,843.53. For their respective contributions, each
received monthly benefits which were equivalent. Id. at n.5.
[Vol. 4:435
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Department.2 4 Manhart sought an injunction and restitution of
the excess contributions.25 While the action was pending in the
district court, California passed a law barring certain municipal
agencies from discriminating on the basis of sex in determining
pension fund contributions.26 The Department amended its plan
to conform to the new law, and began calculating pension contri-
butions and benefits without regard to sex.27 The district court
ruled, on the Department's motion for summary judgment, that
the Department's former plan constituted an unlawful discrimi-
natory employment practice and thus violated Title VII.2  The
court ordered retroactive relief in the amount of the excess con-
tributions that female employees had made prior to the plan's
amendment.2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.30 The Supreme
Court, however, affirmed only that portion of the decision find-
ing the plan in violation of Title VII,3 1 reversing the award of
retroactive relief.3 2
The Supreme Court's decision turned on the critical ques-
tion of whether, for the purpose of Title VII, the discriminatory
impact on female retirees should be analyzed by comparing the
entire class of female retirees receiving pension benefits to the
entire class of male retirees or, alternatively, should be analyzed
24. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D.
Cal. 1975), alfd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), remand, 577
F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1978).
25. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 706.
26. Act of 1974, ch. 1478, 1974 Cal. Stat. 3237 (codified as amended at CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 7500 (West 1980)).
27. Effective Jan. 1, 1975, the female contribution rate was lowered to the male rate.
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. at 984 n.1.
28. Id. at 984; see supra note 2.
29. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 706.
30. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1976).
31. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707-18.
For this part of the decision, the Court voted 5-2 aligned as follows: Justices Stewart,
White, Powell, and Marshall joined the majority opinion of Justice Stevens; Justice
Blackmun refused to join this part of the decision; Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissented; and Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
32. Id. at 718-23. For this part of the decision, the Court voted 7-1. Justices Stewart,
White, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion by
Justice Stevens. Justice Marshall dissented. Justice Brennan took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of the case.
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by comparing an individual female retiree to an individual male
retiree.33 The Court noted that women as a class live longer than
men as a class, 4 but recognized that many individual women
would not live as long as the average man.35 Therefore, many
women would not fit within the generalization upon which the
pension plan was founded36 Hence, the Court reasoned, an un-
identified number of women were being unfairly subjected to
discrimination on the basis of sex:37 they would not live as long
as some of their male colleagues, yet they would receive smaller
paychecks and would not be compensated for the deficiency
upon retirement. 8
Furthermore, the Court rejected the Department's conten-
tion that the plan was based on lawful discrimination as permit-
ted by the Bennett Amendment of Title VII39 and the Equal
Pay Act.4 ° Specifically, these laws sanction discrimination based
33. Id. at 708. The Court focused on this as a critical question because Title VII
relates to unlawful employment discrimination against "individuals." Id.; see supra note
2.
34. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704.
35. Id. at 708.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 707-10. The Court would likely have decided differently had it based
its analysis on a comparison of classes or groups. Specifically, females as a group, al-
though contributing more initially, ultimately aggregate more benefits due to the mortal-
ity differential. See supra note 12.
39. The Bennett Amendment permits an employer to "differentiate upon the basis
of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to em-
ployees of such employer if such differential is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act]." Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)).
40. The Equal Pay Act provides in part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
. . . (iv) a differential based on any factor other than sex ....
Fair Labor Standards Act (Equal Pay Act), § 3(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
In analyzing the Equal Pay Act, the Court added: "We need not decide whether
retirement benefits or contributions to benefit plans are 'wages' under the Act, because
the Bennett Amendment extends the Act's four exceptions to all forms of 'compensation'
covered by Title VII." City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss2/7
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on a factor other than sex.4' The Court disagreed with the De-
partment's argument that it had permissively discriminated on
the basis of longevity rather than sex. The Court stated that the
plan "distinguished only imperfectly between long-lived and
short-lived employees, while distinguishing precisely between
male and female employees."'42 According to the Court, an
actuarial distinction based entirely on sex cannot possibly be
based on a factor other than sex. Instead, it stated, "[s]ex is
exactly what it is based on.'
4
Finally, the Manhart Court noted that its decision was not
intended to revolutionize the pension industry." It emphasized
that the only issue to be decided was whether it was unlawful to
require men and women to make unequal contributions to an
employer-operated pension fund.' 5 The Court added that "noth-
ing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an em-
ployer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each em-
ployee and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his
or her accumulated contributions could command in the open
market."' "4 The Court warned, however, that an employer could
not delegate discriminatory programs to "corporate shells" to
circumvent the protections embodied in Title VII by making the
dispute one between an employee and a third party. This dicta
was a major focus of the Norris decision five years later.48
at 712 n.23.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). See supra note 40.
42. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 713 n.24;
see also id. at 712-13.
43. Id. at 712-13 (quoting Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power,
553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1976)).
44. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717.
45. Id. at 717-18.
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 718 n.33. The Court stated:
We do not suggest, of course, that an employer can avoid his responsibilities by
delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells. Title VII applies to "any
agent" of a covered employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the
Equal Pay Act applies to "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). In this case, for
example, the Department could not deny that the administrative board was its
agent after it successfully argued that the two were so inseparable that both
shared the city's immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33.
48. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510. See infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
1984]
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B. Retroactive Relief
1. The Albemarle decision
The Court's decision in Manhart not to refund past contri-
butions made under the unlawful pension plan'9 runs counter to
the presumption in favor of awarding back pay, announced three
years earlier in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.50 In Albemarle,
the Court outlined the standards by which courts should fashion
relief when an employer is found to be in violation of Title VII 1
The Court indicated that although retroactive relief in the form
of back pay is not awarded automatically,5 2 the choice of reme-
dies is not left to a court's unfettered discretion." When faced
with a decision to grant or to deny retroactive relief, the court
should look to the underlying purposes of Title VII."
The Albemarle Court, in a case involving racial discrimina-
tion,55 identified two primary purposes of Title VII.6 The first is
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees."' The second is
to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlaw-
ful employment discrimination."
With respect to the first purpose, the Albemarle Court indi-
cated that back pay acts as a "spur or catalyst which causes em-
49. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702; see infra
notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
50. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In Manhart, Justice Stevens nevertheless reaffirmed the
Albemarle presumption and limited his discussion solely to pension plans. City of Los
Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 723. This has led one commen-
tator to conclude that "Manhart appears only to add a degree of uncertainty" to the
Albemarle presumption in favor of granting retroactive relief in individual Title VII
cases. The Supreme Court: 1977 Term, 92 HAsv. L. REV. 5, 308 (1978-1979).
51. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 415-22; see supra note 6.
52. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 415. Title VII provides that a court
"may" order back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); see supra note 6.
53. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 416.
54. Id. at 417.
55. Id. The original purpose of Title VII was to eliminate racial discrimination. The
inclusion of the word "sex" in the statute was a last-minute addition with almost no
congressional debate. See Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 H.Av. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
56. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-19.
57. Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
58. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418.
[Vol. 4:435
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ployers and unions to... self-evaluate their employment prac-
tices"' 9 with a view to eliminating unlawful discrimination.o It
maintained that if employers faced only an injunctive order,
they would have little incentive to amend their discriminatory
practices."'
As to the second purpose of Title VII, the Court noted that
the legislative history of the statute evinced an intent to provide
a remedy designed to make the injured party whole.' Thus, it
followed that awarding back pay would be consistent with the
purposes and legislative history of the statute; 3 awards provid-
ing for back pay make whole the wronged employee, whereas
prospective relief merely eliminates the incidence of discrimina-
tion in the future." The Court concluded that given these two
underlying premises, back pay should be awarded unless such an
award would "frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradi-
cating discrimination throughout the economy and making per-
sons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.""
2. Retroactive relief denied in Manhart
The Supreme Court was persuaded in Manhart to overcome
the presumption, created by Albemarle,s in favor of granting
retroactive relief.6 7 The Court noted, however, that their deci-
sion not to award retroactive relief should not qualify the Al-
bemarle presumption for future cases." Instead they recognized
59. Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th
Cir. 1973)).
60. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-18.
61. Id. at 417.
62. Id. at 419. The Court noted that the legislative history indicates that the back
pay provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), was modeled after the back pay provi-
sion of the National Labor Relations Act. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at
419. Further, the Court noted that Congress was aware, upon the enactment of Title VII,
that the NLRB "since its inception, has awarded back pay as a matter of course -not
randomly or in the exercise of a standardless discretion." Id. at 419-20.
The Court also noted that in passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Congress considered several bills to limit a Court's power to award back pay, and
all were rejected. Id. at 420.
63. Id. at 419-22.
64. See id. at 417-18.
65. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
66. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
67. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 719-23.
68. Id. at 723.
19841
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that the pension plan at issue involved special considerations
which needed to be examined before the Albemarle presumption
would be followed. 9
The Court's examination of these considerations persuaded
it, in the end, that it was error for the district court to grant
retroactive relief. 70 First, it noted that due to the problem's com-
plexity,71 the fact that courts had heretofore been silent on the
question,72 and the conflicting views that had been expressed by
administrative agencies,73 the Department's failure to amend the
plan was not unreasonable. " Retroactive relief, the Court added,
was not essential to spur other administrators to modify their
plans to conform to the mandates of the decision. 5 Second, the
Court reasoned that since pension plans are the result of a care-
ful assessment of probable liability, a midstream unforeseen
change such as retroactive relief would possibly "[jeopardize] the
insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insured's benefits." 6
Thus, the Manhart Court's decision to grant the plaintiff
prospective relief, rather than retroactive relief, turned primarily
on the absence of notice and the defendant's inability to pay.
Since the employer operating the plan was probably unaware
that the plan violated Title VII, it would be unfair to hold the
employer liable retroactively.7 7 Perhaps more importantly, such
an award would be contrary to the interests of the employee-
plaintiff class.78 Given the time that had elapsed since Man-
69. Id. at 719-23.
70. Id. at 723.
71. Id. at 720. The Court noted that pension administrators could reasonably have
assumed that it would be illegal or unfair to equalize male and female benefits. Specifi-
cally, due to a male's shorter life span, discrimination might be alleged based on the
requirement that males as a group shoulder more than a fair share of the "actuarial
burden." Id. See also Note, supra note 12, at 633-34.
One commentator has noted that introducing "complexity" of the issues as a factor
in awarding a retroactive remedy for a Title VII violation may permit some employers to
avoid amending discriminatory practices until a clear mandate of their unlawfulness is
declared by a court. The Supreme Court: 1977 Term, supra note 50, at 309.
72. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720.
73. Id. The Court pointed to the different positions on the use of sex-based mortal-
ity tables held by the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Administrator. Id. at n.92.
74. Id. at 720.
75. Id. at 720-21.
76. Id. at 721.
77. See id. at 720-21; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
78. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721. See
[Vol. 4:435
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hart 9 and the distinguishing factual elements,80 the Supreme
Court in Norris had to determine whether these rationales con-
tinued to be valid.
III. Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris
A. The Facts
Nathalie Norris, an employee of the Arizona Department of
Economic Security, participated in a state-administered volun-
tary retirement benefit program which enabled her to defer re-
ceipt of part of her earnings until she retired."' The state's pro-
gram included several options, one of which permitted the
accrued savings to be used to purchase a life annuity.8 2 Since
Arizona law prohibits the state from undertaking the risk of
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. Approximately five years had elapsed between Manhart and Norris.
80. Two facts distinguish Manhart and Norris. First, the retirement plan at issue in
Manhart was a "defined-benefit" plan and as such it discriminated at the "pay-in" stage.
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704. See supra
notes 13, 18-23 and accompanying text. Norris was a "defined-contribution" plan and as
such it discriminated at the "pay-out" stage. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494. See supra note
13 and infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. Second, the Manhart plan was oper-
ated directly by the employer, City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. at 704-05, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, while in Norris a third-
party insurer administered the plan. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 349. See infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
81. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3494-95 (1983). By con-
trast, the Manhart plan provided retirement benefits in the form of a mandatory pension
plan. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704-05
(1978). See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
82. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494. A life annuity may be defined as a periodic payment
which commences at a contingent or future date and continues for the designated life of
the annuitant. E. VAUGHAN, supra note 12, at 190.
Retirement payouts are calculated on the basis of the value of the person's account
at the time of retirement divided by the number of months a person of that age and sex
is expected to live, and factored by any guaranteed payment period. Norris v. Arizona
Governing Comm., 486 F. Supp. 645, 648 (D. Ariz. 1980). A guaranteed payment period
insures that payments on the annuity will continue for a certain guaranteed period if the
annuitant dies soon after retirement. E. VAUGHAN, supra note 12, at 191.
The other options provided under the Norris plan included receiving the entire ac-
cumulated amount in a "lump sum" or receiving periodic payments for a fixed period of
time. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494. Neither of these options used sex as a determinative
factor. See id. at 3505 (Powell, J., dissenting). No one contends that either of these op-
tions is discriminatory. Therefore, they are not included in the present dispute. Id.
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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financing life annuities,8 the state contracted with private insur-
ance companies who provided the annuities."'
These private companies used separate sex-based mortality
tables which reflect the actuarial determination that female em-
ployees as a group are expected to live longer.8 5 Consequently,
they collect a larger number of monthly benefit checks than sim-
ilarly situated male employees.86 Thus, to equalize the aggregate
benefit payments received by the class of males and the class of
females, women annuitants received smaller monthly checks.87
Although Mrs. Norris and a comparable male co-worker made
identical contributions to the plan during their lifetimes, upon
retirement the male received a larger benefit check each
month.88
Mrs. Norris brought a class action alleging that the state vi-
olated Title VIP'8 by administering an annuity plan that dis-
criminated on the basis of sex.90 The district court certified the
cause as a class actions' and granted summary judgment in favor
of the class.92 The court held that the Arizona plan violated Ti-
tle VII.93 It directed the state to pay males and females equal
monthly retirement benefits.9 4 The court of appeals, with one
judge dissenting, affirmed." The Supreme Court affirmed, but
overturned the district court award in so far as it involved retro-
83. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-871.C.1 (1974).
84. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
85. See supra note 12.
86. See supra note 82.
87. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495.
88. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 648. The district court
pointed out that if Mrs. Norris did not increase or decrease the amount she deferred, the
total value of her account at age 65 would be $53,890.93, and the corresponding annuity
payment received would be $320.11 per month for life, with 10 years certain. If she were
male, and all the other above factors remained identical, she would receive $354.07 per
month for life with 10 years certain. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See supra note 2.
90. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 486 F. Supp. at 647.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 652.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982). District Judge
Nielsen, sitting by designation, concluded that the Arizona plan fell within the Manhart
open market exception. Id. at 336 (Nielsen, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying
note 46.
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active payments to the plaintiffs."6
B. The Decision
1. The plan's discriminatory impact under Title VII
The Supreme Court, although noting that the Norris and
Manhart retirement plans differed in two aspects, found little
difficulty in extending the principles of Manhart to the Norris
plan.9' Regarding the first distinction, the Court noted that the
Manhart plan required female employees to "pay-in" more from
their paychecks than similarly employed males in order to re-
ceive equal benefits upon retiring.98 The Norris plan, on the
other hand, required men and women to contribute equally, but
women received less "pay-out" in the form of lower monthly
benefits.9 9 Mindful of this distinction, the Court nevertheless
ruled that the classification on the basis of sex "is no more per-
missible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the
96. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3492. The Court was careful to avoid a remedy which would
have retroactive consequences and ruled that only those funds collected after the effec-
tive date of the decision in Norris would have to be disbursed upon retirement without
regard to the sex of the employee. Specifically, because the plan was a defined-contribu-
tion plan, the discrimination would not occur until the time of pay-out. See supra note
13. As such, without limiting relief to funds collected after the decision, the annuitant's
newly calculated benefits could include funds collected before Norris. See Norris, 103 S.
Ct. at 3509 n.10.
The Court issued a two-part per curiam opinion. In the first part, the Court held
that the Norris plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title
VII. Further, all retirement benefits derived from contributions made after the Court's
Norris decision must be calculated without regard to the annuitant's sex. In the second
part, the Court denied retroactive relief, holding that only those benefits derived from
contributions made before the Norris decision may be calculated under the existing Ari-
zona plan. Id. at 3493.
On the question of whether the Arizona plan violated Title VII, the Court voted 5-4.
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall
wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens. Justice
Powell wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black-
mun and Rehnquist. On the question of retroactive relief, the Court also voted 5-4. Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. Justice Powell
wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist. Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Stevens. Id. at 3492.
97. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3496-99; see supra note 80.
98. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705.
99. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494-95.
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pay-in stage."' 00 The Court, therefore, concluded that the Ari-
zona plan would violate Title VII if the state, like the municipal-
ity in Manhart, had administered the plan itself.'0 '
It then addressed the second distinguishing aspect: whether
the state was outside the scope of Title VII, because it used the
services of a private third party insurance company instead of
directly administering the plan.10 2 Arizona contended that the
state was in compliance with the caveat in Manhart that "it
would [not] be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal re-
tirement contributions for each employee and let each retiree
purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated con-
tribution could command in the open market."'0 s Arizona con-
tended its plan fell within the open market exception, relying on
a stipulation 104 that all industry actuarial tables provide for
larger payments to males than to females of equal age, total con-
tribution, and guaranteed payment period.1
0 5
The Court rejected Arizona's argument and reasoned that it
was irrelevant that no other insurers offered a sex-neutral annu-
ity plan.'"e Instead, the Court maintained, several significant as-
pects of the plan demonstrated that the state's employees were
not merely purchasing a plan on the "open market.' 07 For in-
stance, the state solicited bids requesting the terms on which the
companies would supply the benefits, 08 selected the companies
that were permitted to participate in the plan,109 entered into
100. Id. at 3497. This conclusion was consistent with the disposition of the question
by all the lower courts with the exception of one. Id. at 3497 n.9.
101. Id. at 3499.
102. Id. This question is critical because Title VII "primarily governs relations be-
tween employees and their employer, not between employers and third parties." Id.
(quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33).
103. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499-500 (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18 (footnotes omitted)).
104. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3500. This stipulation was contained in the statement of
facts. Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality, pointed out that the stipulation "on
which petitioners rely means only that all the tables used by the companies taking part
in the Arizona plan are based on sex, but our conclusion does not depend upon whether
petitioner's contention of the stipulation is accepted or rejected." Id. (footnote omitted).
105. Id. See supra note 82.
106. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
107. See id. at 3500-01.
108. Id. at 3501. The Court noted that Arizona asked potential plan administrators
to list their annuity rates for men and women separately. Id. at 3501 n.19.
109. Id. at 3501.
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contracts with the companies which governed the terms on
which the benefits were to be provided, " and restricted employ-
ees enrolled in the plan to obtaining retirement benefits only
from one of the selected companies.' The Court found that
these activities, in the aggregate, constituted sufficient participa-
tion to bring the plan outside the Manhart "open market"
caveat."'1
The Court concluded that under these circumstances the
state was ultimately responsible for the privileges granted em-
ployees by the retirement plan. " Since the privileges were dis-
bursed on a discriminatory basis, the state should not be able to
avoid liability on the ground that it was unable to find a third
party insurance company willing to use sex-neutral actuarial ta-
bles.' 14 In such a situation, the Court added, an employer should
either provide the non-discriminatory benefits himself, or not
provide them at all." 5
2. The denial of retroactive relief
The Norris Court adopted the same reasoning set forth in
Manhart for denying retroactive relief to the plaintiffs. " 6 The
Court's reluctance in Manhart and Norris to follow the Al-
bemarle presumption'17 was premised on several considerations.
First, the Court in Manhart stated that administrators of pen-
sion funds may well have assumed that a program like the De-
partment's was lawful." 8 This was, the Court wrote, because no
court had addressed the question of sex-based mortality tables
prior to Manhart,"' and the administrative agencies had ex-
pressed conflicting views. 120
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 3502.
113. Id. at 3501.
114. Id. at 3502.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3509-10.
117. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1975). See supra notes
50-66 and accompanying text.
118. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720; see
supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
119. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720-21.
120. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722; see
19841
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Similarly, the Norris Court concluded that the defendants
did not have notice that their plan was in violation of Title
VII. 2 ' The Court noted that although Manhart put all em-
ployer-operated plans on notice that unequal contributions for
equal retirement benefits would be unlawful under Title VII,
they added that Manhart approved the practice of permitting
each retiree to purchase on the "open market" an annuity in the
amount of his contribution. 22 Notwithstanding their finding in
Norris that Arizona could not come under the "open market"
exception, 23 the majority concluded that the plan's administra-
tors could have reasonably assumed that by offering their em-
ployees the option of purchasing an annuity from a third party
insurance company that the plan qualified under the "open mar-
ket" exception of Manhart. Therefore, the Court concluded,
there would be no justification for holding Arizona liable retro-
actively, since the state did not have adequate notice that the
retirement plan violated Title VII.12 4
The Court in Norris, as in Manhart, found that awarding
retroactive relief in the case of a pension plan would be
financially dangerous. 125 Drastic changes in the legal rules gov-
erning pension and insurance funds require adequate time for a
pension administrator to adjust his plan, because the success or
failure of such plans depend upon an accurate prediction of the
future.12 The Court noted that a major unforeseen change, such
as equalizing benefits for men and women retroactively, could
jeopardize the plan's ability to pay future obligations.12 7 It con-
cluded that since the decision to equalize benefits was a marked
departure from past practice, relief should be prospective
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
121. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
124. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510.
125. Id. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim for retroactive relief by stating in
part that the district court's award would have "devastating" results. As authority for
this proposition the Court cited a Department of Labor study showing that the cost of
complying with the district court award for all employer-sponsored pension plans in the
United States "would range from $817 to $1260 million annually for the next 15 to 30
years." Id. (footnote omitted).
126. See id.
127. See id.
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only. 128
IV. Analysis
The Norris Court was probably correct in extending the
principles of Manhart to find Title VII liability, 129 but erred in
denying a modified retroactive relief award to Mrs. Norris and
her class. First, while the Manhart Court was perhaps justified
in rejecting the Albemarle presumption' " in the interest of pro-
viding pension administrators with adequate notice, these con-
siderations were not present in Norris. Manhart clearly estab-
lished that the use of sex-based actuarial tables by an employer
in determining retirement benefits was unlawful under Title
VII.13 1 Therefore, Manhart provided adequate notice.
Despite the existence of the Manhart "open market" excep-
tion, a reasonable interpretation of the Manhart opinion should
have provided Arizona with adequate notice that its plan would
not fall within this exception. " 2 The Manhart Court clearly in-
dicated that while Title VII' 3 3 and the Equal Pay Act 4 prima-
rily govern relationships between employees and employers, an
employer could not avoid liability by delegating discriminatory
programs to "corporate shells."13  Furthermore, the Court clari-
fied its position by indicating that Title VII applies to "any
128. See id.
129. The scope of this Note is limited to the issue relating to the decision whether
to grant or to deny retroactive relief. The following reasons are given, however, to indi-
cate why the author concurs with the majority's decision to extend the principles of
Manhart to find Title VII liability in Norris. The Norris Court expressed no hesitation
in extending the principles applied in Manhart to prohibit the use of sex-based mortality
tables by a third party insurance company who contracts with the employer to provide
an employee retirement plan. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text. This deci-
sion is a sound one since to rule otherwise could weaken the effect of Manhart. If the
plan at issue in Norris had been found lawful, other employers could avoid liability by
operating their plans through third party insurance companies. These companies would
be immune from suit under Title VII in the absence of an employer-employee relation to
trigger the law. See supra notes 2, 100 & 102.
130. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See supra notes 2 & 102.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). See supra note 40.
135. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718
n.33 (1978); see supra note 47.
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agent" of a covered employer' 3e and the Equal Pay Act applies
to "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee. 13 7 In light of the above,
the Arizona administrators, at the very least, should have had an
indication that the Court would not only strike down a Man-
hart-type plan, but also a plan operated by a third party on be-
half of an employer. 3 8 Thus the Norris Court was not justified
in placing the same emphasis on notice in overcoming the Al-
bemarle presumption as was the Court in Manhart.
Second, the Supreme Court in its absolute rejection of the
district court's award missed an opportunity to uphold the prin-
ciples of Manhart and Albemarle. The district court had ruled
that "annuity payments to female employees who have retired
shall be equal to similarly situated male employees." 39 The Su-
preme Court recognized that appropriate relief ought to be pro-
spective only 140 and that the district court's rule, although seem-
ingly prospective, was "fundamentally retroactive in nature. ' ' 4
If Norris had fashioned a modified retroactive remedy, rather
than rejecting the district court award entirely, it would have
been consistent with Manhart without weakening the Albemarle
presumption. Relief could have been limited to those contribu-
tions made subsequent to Manhart.142 Specifically, Manhart ex-
136. A "covered" employer is defined as follows:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any depart-
ment or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the
competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5) or (2) a bona fide private
membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation
under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24,
1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not
be considered employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1976).
137. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718 n.33.
138. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
139. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 486 F. Supp. 645, 652 (D. Ariz. 1980).
140. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3510 (1983).
141. Id. at 3509 n.10; see supra note 96.
142. This minority view was suggested by Justice Marshall who concludes:
To the extent that any disparity in benefits coming due after the date of the Dis-
trict Court judgment is attributable to contributions made after Manhart, there is
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pressly stated that the force of the Albemarle presumption was
not qualified by the Manhart holding.' " Manhart denied retro-
active relief4 4 not because it was per se an inappropriate rem-
edy, but because the pension administrators lacked adequate no-
tice 145 and such relief would have caused undue financial
hardship.1' Thus, because Manhart effectively notified the Ari-
zona administrators that its plan was likely to be in violation of
Title VII, the Norris Court had no justification for refusing to
examine the feasibility of upholding the Albemarle presumption
by awarding retroactive relief for the period subsequent to the
decision in Manhart.1
47
Furthermore, modified retroactive relief would lessen the
financial hardship envisioned by the Norris Court.148 In short,
while Norris may have been correct in applying many of the
Manhart principles, a wholesale rejection of retroactive relief
was unwarranted.
Third, as noted by the Albemarle Court, one of the central
purposes in awarding retroactive relief is to provide a "catalyst"
to induce employers to amend their discriminatory practices as
quickly as possible.1 49 Without the threat of having to pay a ret-
roactive award, an employer has no financial incentive to act un-
therefore no unfairness in requiring petitioners to pay retired female employees
whatever sum is necessary each month to bring them up to the benefit level that
they would have enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated in
the same way as those of similarly situated male employees.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3503.
143. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 723.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 720-21; see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
146. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721; see
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 142.
148. Whereas a full-scale retroactive award might have had severe economic effects,
see supra note 125, a modified retroactive award, only including contributions made af-
ter Manhart, would obviously not have had the same severe effects since a shorter time
period and therefore fewer benefit payments would be involved. Another factor to con-
sider would be to pool all existing resources in the fund and to recalculate benefits based
on a "unisex" table. See Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3512 n.4. This Note does not attempt to
deal with the possible ramifications of relying on "unisex" tables in calculating retire-
ment benefits.
149. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); see supra notes 59-
61 and accompanying text.
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til ordered to do so by a court.'50 The Court in Norris, as in
Manhart,15 indicated that retroactive relief is not necessary to
induce other pension administrators to modify their retirement
plans to equalize benefits. 5 ' The Norris decision itself, however,
is a reminder that merely granting injunctive relief may not pro-
vide other pension administrators with the incentive to carefully
explore the possibility that their plans may be discriminatory.
Perhaps the Court's reluctance in Manhart to award retroactive
relief eliminated the Albemarle "catalyst" 53 and thus the incen-
tive for the Arizona administrators to modify their plan. Simi-
larly, the Norris decision may have further weakened the
financial inducement to compel pension administrators after
Norris to quickly modify their plans without a court order.
Finally, the Court in Norris, as in Manhart, ignored entirely
the Albemarle Court's interpretation of one of the central pur-
poses of Title VII. In Albemarle, the Court indicated that per-
sons injured on account of unlawful employment discrimination
should be made whole.'" The Norris Court focused on the em-
ployer's ability to a pay a retroactive award, 5  thus shifting the
emphasis away from fashioning an award designed to make the
plaintiff whole, to fashioning an award based on the ability of
the defendant to pay such an award. Consequently, Norris may
have emasculated the "make whole" purpose of Title VII.
V. Conclusion
In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, e the Supreme
Court extended the reach of Title VII to retirement plans, oper-
ated for the benefit of employees by third party insurance com-
panies, which unlawfully discriminate on the basis of sex. The
Court, however, continued to deny retroactrive relief upon a
finding that such retirement plans violate Title VII. As a result
of Norris, it is now questionable whether the force of the Al-
150. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-18.
151. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720-21.
152. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
154. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 419-21; see supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text.
155. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510.
156. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
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bemarle presumption continues unqualified, despite the Man-
hart Court's assurance that it does. By using the Manhart ra-
tionale to strike down a retroactive award based on facts which
did not present the same novel circumstances as did Manhart,
the Norris Court seems to have taken an unnecessary step in
weakening the Albemarle presumption. This trend threatens to
undermine both the inducement that the Albemarle presump-
tion created for employers to comply with the mandates of Title
VII and the central statutory purpose of Title VII to "make
whole" those injured as a result of a Title VII violation.
Bradford A. Fuller
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